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Abstract: The literature on the European Union Emission Trading System
(EU ETS) is by now very rich. Much is known about the efficiency, the effective-
ness, and the environmental and distributional impacts of the EU ETS. Less,
however, is known about the carousel value-added-tax (VAT) fraud phenomena
in the European carbon market. This article evaluates the welfare effects of
carousel VAT fraud in the EU ETS using a computable general equilibrium
(CGE) analysis. According to our findings, if VAT fraud occurs in the EU ETS,
the effects on welfare for the EU Member States are negative, with welfare loss
significantly higher than the VAT fraud value. This article also discusses the
reverse charge mechanism that EU Member States could adopt to reduce the VAT
fraud phenomena in the European carbon market.
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1 Introduction
By signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, a number of industrialized countries, the
so-called Annex 1 countries, committed themselves to reducing their greenhouse
gas emissions relative to their 1990 levels (UN, 1998). Therefore, in 2000 the
European Union (EU) Commission launched the European Climate Change
Programme (ECCP), a continuous multi-stakeholder consultative process,
which serves to identify cost-effective ways for the EU to meet its Kyoto commit-
ments, to set priorities for action, and to implement concrete measures. One of
the main elements of this program was the establishment of the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), regulated by Directive 2003/87/EC of the
European Parliament and Council of 13 October 2003 (EC, 2003) and recently
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amended by Directive 2009/29/CE of the European Parliament and Council of 23
April 2009 (EC, 2009).
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system for transactions of European Union
Allowances (EUAs) and is implemented as a downstream system; i. e. the users
(rather than the producers and importers of fossil fuels) will be obliged to hold
emission allowances. Under the EU ETS, trading is to occur between individual
emitters, which comprise more than 11,000 installations in 30 different countries
(the 27 EU Member States and Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway), worth EUR 103
billion in 2009. In this regime, the EU Member States have three important tasks.
First, they have to decide the quantity of emissions that should be allocated to
the installations participating in the ETS. Second, they have to draw up a list of
all installations that are subject to emissions trading. Third, they have to decide
how to allocate the total quantity among individual installations. The EU ETS
started on 1 January 2005 and is being implemented in three main phases. The
first trading phase – nicknamed the “warming-up phase” or ‘learning phase’ –
covered the years 2005–2007. The scheme covered only CO2 emissions from
high-emitting installations in the power and heat generation industry and in
selected energy-intensive industrial sectors. It established free trade in emission
allowances across the EU and the necessary infrastructure for monitoring,
reporting and verifying actual emissions from the businesses covered. The
Directive 2003/87/EC sets some general rules according to which the allocation
has to be made, but there is substantial scope for national priorities. In fact, the
decisions have to be set down in a national allocation plan (NAP). The second
phase covered the years 2008–2012, the five-year period during which the EU
and its Member States must comply with their emission targets under the Kyoto
Protocol. In this phase, new industrial sectors, such as glass and petrochemical
production, have been introduced. Emissions of nitrous oxide from the produc-
tion of nitric acid have also been included in this phase. Furthermore, the
Commission has cut the volume of emissions allowances permitted in phase 2
to 6.5% below the 2005 level. The third phase covers the period from 2013 to
2020. It requires an increased proportion of installations to buy their emissions
allowances via auction rather than receiving free allocations. It includes the
abolition of the NAPs and adoption instead of a centralized emissions cap.
It also includes CO2 emissions from civil aviation. The main aim of this phase
is to encourage long-term investment in emissions reductions.
The literature on EU ETS is by now very rich (i. e. Endres and Ohl, 2005; Betz
and Sato, 2006; Kemfert et al., 2006; Silva and Zhu, 2008; Woerdman et al.,
2008; Eichner and Pethig, 2009; Wettestad, 2009; Heindl and Voigt, 2012; Jones
et al., 2013; Skjærseth, 2013) and different aspects have been addressed: effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and environmental and distributional consequences.
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Branger et al. (2013) report a detailed survey of the major issues related to EU
ETS. Criticisms include insufficient carbon emissions reduction, competitiveness
losses and unfair distributional effects. Furthermore, during the first trading
phase over the period 2005–2007, value-added-tax (VAT) carousel fraud
emerged as a major threat to the EU ETS market (Estrada and Marquez, 2010;
Kogels, 2010; Nield and Pereira, 2011; Wolf, 2011; Branger et al., 2013). The
carousel VAT fraud in EUAs is a form of “missing trader fraud”, well known in
the trade of goods. Fraudulent traders, making use of stolen VAT identification
numbers, buy carbon credits tax-free in one EU Member State, then sell them in
another Member State at a mark-up by including VAT. After one or more
transactions, they disappear without having paid the VAT to the government.
It is estimated that up to 90% of the volume of the market for tradable emission
rights was the result of fraudulent activities, leading to a loss of tax revenues of
approximately 5 billion euros (Europol, 2009).
Despite the relevance of the VAT carousel fraud in the EU carbon market,
this phenomena has not been systematically addressed in the literature. The
present article stands as a novel research that aims at evaluating the welfare
effects of the VAT carousel fraud in the EU ETS.
We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the quantitative
impact assessment. A CGE model describes an economy in equilibrium with endo-
genously determined relative prices and quantities. An assessment of the useful-
ness of CGE models for policy analysis can be found in Shoven and Whalley (1992)
and Hertel (1997). More specifically, we use the GTAP-E model, developed by
Burniaux and Truong (2002), and the GTAP database (Dimaranan and McDougall,
2006). Thismodel and database have beenwidely used for the analysis of emissions
trading (i. e. Nijkamp et al., 2005; Dagoumas et al., 2006; Kemfert et al., 2006).
In our policy analysis, we first simulate the EU ETS in the first phase
(2005–2007); then we investigate the question of what the welfare effects
would be if VAT fraud occurs in the European carbon market. Our findings
show that there is an increasing relationship between VAT fraud and welfare
loss, but we also identify a diminishing marginal effect of VAT fraud on welfare
loss. The negative welfare change is significantly higher than the VAT fraud
value. The article concludes with a discussion on a reverse charge mechanism
that the EU Member States could adopt to reduce the phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the VAT
carousel fraud phenomena; the third section reports the modeling framework,
database and calibration; the fourth section explains the policy scenarios; the
fifth section reports the simulation results; the sixth section discusses the
reverse charge mechanism aimed at eliminating the risk of VAT fraud and, in
the last section, we draw concluding remarks.
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2 The VAT fraud
Carousel fraud is nothing more than stealing VAT from the tax authorities. It all
boils down to charging VAT on sales and collecting this VAT from customers.
These amounts are then embezzled instead of being paid to the tax authorities.
Carousel fraud takes advantage of the workings of the VAT scheme to hit the
system itself. At the heart of each carousel fraud is the so-called “missing
trader”: this is a company controlled by the “ringmaster” (the mastermind
behind the fraud). Carousel fraud is not limited to trade in tangible goods
(mobile phones, computer equipment, perfumes, and other high value, low
volume goods, often used due to their ease of transportation and the high VAT
revenues that can be generated from them); intangibles can also be used to set
up a VAT carousel (Wolf, 2011).
Carousel fraud is a serious problem imposing a threat to government income
of the EU countries. Following Efstratios (2012), a typical example, reported in
Figure 1, would be one in which a company (X, or missing trader), registered for
Company Y
EU Member State i
Company X
EU Member State j
(missing trader, 
fraudster)
Company Z
EU Member State j
Exchange 
platform
Exchange 
platform
Government
EU Member State j
Transaction No.1 – No VAT
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
io
n
 N
o
.2
 –
 V
A
T
 c
h
a
r
g
e
d
 a
n
d
 n
o
t
 p
a
id
 t
o
 t
h
e
 g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
tRefund of the VAT charged by Company X
Criminal organization
Figure 1: The VAT carousel fraud.
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VAT in any EU Member State, buys goods from another company (Y) of another
EU Member State and then sells those goods to a company (Z) located in the
same EU Member State as the missing trader (company X). Company X is
controlled by a criminal organization that may be located in any EU Member
State. As the first operation between company X and Y constitutes an intra-
Community transaction, it is exempt from VAT, and the purchaser (X) does not
incur any VAT from the seller (Y). However, the subsequent transaction between
the buyer (Z) and the seller (X), residing in the same EU Member State, consti-
tutes a supply of goods liable and non-exempt, and the selling company (X)
charges the VAT to the purchaser (Z). Thus, having charged VAT on the internal
transaction, the selling company (X) quickly disappears or declares itself insol-
vent without paying its dues to the Treasury, fraudulently obtaining the amount
of VAT due. For its part, the purchaser (Z) subsequently applies to deduct the
VAT, with the consequent loss to the corresponding Treasury. In fact, as a result,
the government does not collect the VAT charged by the seller company (X) to
buyer company (Z), while at the same time refunding this amount to the buyer.
In this representation, we consider only one transaction of VAT fraud, but the
crime often includes a complex web of transactions and the existence of many
fraudsters, as the crime is quick to execute and leaves little documentary
evidence. Thus, VAT fraud is difficult to detect and prosecute (Nield and
Pereira, 2011).
Although large individual fraud cases are discovered now and then, it is not
clear exactly how much the EU countries lose on carousel fraud each year. In
2009, the European Commission published a study on the VAT gap in the EU
countries during the period 2000–2006. This VAT gap was calculated as the
difference between the theoretical VAT liability for the economy as a whole and
the accrued VAT receipts in a given year. In the report produced by Reckon LLP,
following a study commissioned by the European Commission, Directorate-
General for Taxation and Customs Union, the yearly EU-wide VAT gap is esti-
mated to range around 100 billion euros. This figure does not represent the
actual level of fraud, as it also includes losses as a result of tax avoidance
structures and regular insolvencies. However, it does seem to provide an upper
limit for the losses as a result of VAT fraud, including carousel fraud.
The nature of emissions rights makes the carbon market a perfect tool for
the execution of fraud. In fact, emissions allowances are not real physical goods,
but represent intangible, tradable environmental property rights or regulatory
property rights, as defined by Cole (2002). In particular, the potential for large
trading volumes together with their intangible nature enables quick operations
with very large quantities and, hence, allows the theft of huge sums of money.
Through (electronic) exchanges, carbon credits can be traded instantly, avoiding
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the cost and delay involved in physical delivery (Wolf, 2011). The carousel fraud
in emissions trading is a relatively simple form of “missing trader fraud”:
fraudulent traders, making use of stolen VAT identification numbers, buy car-
bon credits tax-free in one EU Member State, then sell them in another Member
State at a markup by including VAT and then (after one or more transactions,
including those with bona fide traders) disappear without having paid the VAT
to the Treasury of the country in which the sale was made (Kogels, 2010). By
trading emissions allowances via a series of “carousels”, the amount of VAT that
can be fraudulently acquired is increased each time the allowances are circu-
lated among this carousel of conspirator companies.
In this scheme, sometimes transactions were apparently concluded at a loss.
It does not matter, as the real profit is the embezzled VAT. With tax percentages
ranging from 15% to 25%, the VAT offers a comfortable profit margin. The
missing trader’s only interest is to make as much trade as possible. As a result,
it creates a situation where you have a party that is willing to buy at relatively
high prices and sell at relatively low prices. In an electronic marketplace, such a
party can generate huge trading volumes in the blink of an eye (Nield and
Pereira, 2011; Wolf, 2011).
VAT fraud on the EU ETS was first suspected due to an unprecedented rise
in EUA spot trading volumes towards the end of 2008. This peaked on June 2nd
2009, when a record of 19.8 million metric tons of CO2 was traded on the
Bluenext spot exchange (the largest carbon spot exchange in Europe). It
appeared that allowances for immediate delivery were purchased by a company
with little business activity and few assets, and VAT charged to other companies
without its subsequent declaration. Rumors that these volumes were being
driven by VAT carousel fraud prompted Bluenext to close its spot exchange.
Before allowing the exchange to open again, the French authorities imposed a
zero-rated VAT status on domestic trades of emission allowances. It estimated
that up to 90% of the volume of the market for tradable emissions rights was the
result of fraudulent activities, leading to a loss of tax revenues of approximately
5 billion euros for a number of EU Member States (Europol, 2009; Nield and
Pereira, 2011; Wolf, 2011).
3 Modelling framework and data calibration
In this study we use the GTAP-E model, developed by Burniaux and Truong
(2002). The GTAP-E model is a comparative static, multi-commodity, multi-
region CGE model with the assumptions of perfect competition, market
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equilibrium and open economy. The GTAP-E is a refinement of the standard
GTAP model (Hertel, 1997), where “E” jointly stands for energy and environ-
ment. In fact, it incorporates energy substitution, carbon emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuels, as well as a full accounting of carbon tax revenues
and a more specific treatment of carbon emissions trading into the standard
GTAP model. As we use a general equilibrium multi-sectorial and multi-regional
trade model, we can take account of the important interactions between changes
in fuel prices, fuel, and factor substitutions, and therefore we can evaluate the
welfare effects of any policy change taking into account not only the direct
effects derived by using partial equilibrium analysis, but also the indirect effects
derived using a CGE modelling framework. The GTAP-E model has been widely
used to discuss energy and climate policy (i. e. Nijkamp et al., 2005; Dagoumas
et al., 2006; Kemfert et al., 2006).
On the consumption side, there is a representative household in region r,
whose Cobb-Douglas utility function allocates expenditures between private
consumption (C), government consumption (G), and savings expenditure (S) as
follows:
Ur =CαC, rr G
αG, r
r S
αS, r
r (1)
with αC,r, αG,r and αS,r income shares and αC,r + αG,r + αS,r = 1
The constrained optimizing behavior of the household in region r for private
consumption is represented by a non-homothetic Constant Difference of
Elasticity (CDE) expenditure function for the set of goods and services. The
CDE, introduced by Hanoch (1975), is based on the assumption of implicit
additivity and allows for a richer representation of income effects on the demand
system. A Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function is employed for government spend-
ing. In this case the expenditure shares are constant across all commodities.
Furthermore, we use the so-called Armington assumption, which treats goods
and services produced in different regions as qualitatively different, that is,
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, across countries (Armington, 1969).
Savings are exhausted on investment and capital markets are assumed to be
in equilibrium only at the global level. In fact, a hypothetical world bank
collects savings from all regions and allocates investments so as to achieve
equality of changes in expected future rates of return:
Δηr =Δη (2)
where Δηr and Δη are the percentage changes, respectively, in region’s rate of
return and global rate of return.
On the production side, producers receive payments for selling consumption
goods to private households and the government, intermediate inputs to other
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producers, and investment goods to the savings sector. Under the zero profit
assumption employed, these revenues must be precisely exhausted on expendi-
tures for intermediate inputs and primary factors of production. The nested
production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and every sector pro-
duces a single output. The technology is simplified by employing the Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form:
yi, r =
Xn
j= 1
θjx
1− 1σ
j, r
 ! σ
σ − 1
(3)
where, in region r, yi,r is the production of the good i, xj,r is the input j, θj is a
non-negative parameter, with
Pn
j= 1
θj = 1, and σ is the elasticity of substitution. CES
functions are usually used to allow substitution between primary factors and
intermediate inputs.
Next, the energy composite is combined with capital to produce an energy-
capital composite, which is in turn combined with other primary factors in a
value-added-energy nest through a CES structure. The energy commodities are
first separated into ‘electricity’ and ‘non-electricity’ groups. Some degree of
substitution is allowed within the non-electricity group, as well as between the
electricity and the non-electricity groups. Both intermediate and final products
from different regions are considered to be imperfectly substitutable with each
other (Armington, 1969).
All factor inputs (land, labor, capital and natural resources) are assumed to
be fully employed and immobile across regions. Capital and labor are perfectly
mobile across sectors and, hence, they earn the same market return regardless of
where they are employed; land and natural resources are sluggish to adjust and
their returns may differ across sectors.
Every economy includes government interventions. Private households and
the government not only spend their available income on consumption goods, but
also pay taxes to the regional household. In the case of the government, taxes
consist of consumption taxes on commodities. In the case of private households,
taxes consist of consumption taxes and income tax net of subsidies. The firms
have to pay taxes to the regional household. These value flows represent taxes on
intermediate inputs and production taxes net of subsidies. Also trade-generated
tax revenues and subsidy expenditures are included in the GTAP model. All taxes
levied in the economy always accrue to the regional household.
In GTAP-E, CO2 emissions are derived from energy volume data through
fixed coefficients. Coefficients are fuel specific, but not region or sector specific.
In calculating the emissions of CO2 it is assumed that every use of fossil energy
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goods leads to CO2 emissions, except for the use of crude oil by refineries to
produce petroleum products. Only when these petroleum products are used
(combusted), is CO2 emitted in the atmosphere. For the rest, no account is
taken of energy goods used as non-energy feedstocks. Changes in regional CO2
emissions are calculated as CO2-weighted changes in domestic production of
fuels plus changes in CO2-weighted imports minus changes in CO2-weighted
exports of fuels. CO2 reduction policies can be implemented in GTAP-E through
taxes and (tradable) quotas. In the model, taxes and quotas are completely
equivalent, i. e., given a certain reduction target, CO2 taxes are identical to CO2
permit prices. Because both tax revenues and the revenues of the sale of permits
are directly transferred to the regional household, there are also no differences
in wealth effects between the two policy instruments. GTAP-E offers the possi-
bility for regions to engage in emissions trading.
The regional income, Yr, is equal to the sum of the endowment income (net
of depreciation), Ye,r, the indirect tax revenues, Tind,r, the emission trading
revenues, Er, and the carbon tax revenues, Ctax,r:
Yr =Ye, r + Tind, r +Er +Ctax, r (4)
Finally, the GTAP-E model respects Walras’ law, which is a principle in general
equilibrium theory asserting that budget constraints imply that the values of
excess market demands (or, conversely, excess market supplies) must sum to
zero. The macroeconomic accounting identity that must be respected by the
model is that the national savings (Sr) minus investment (Ir) is identically equal
to the net exports (NXr), that is:
Sr − Ir =NXr (5)
As global exports (X) need to be equal to global imports (M) such thatX
r
Xr =
X
r
Mr (6)
global investment will be equal to global savings by Walras’ law:X
r
Sr =
X
r
Ir (7)
The GTAP-E model is calibrated using version 6 of the GTAP database (available
at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v6/default.asp), which con-
sists of 57 commodities/sectors and 87 regions, including the 27 European
Member states (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2006). The GTAP database is a
cross-country data set of international trade flows and national input-output
tables. All of the information in the database is reported in values converted to
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US dollars adjusted to year 2001 values. The regional and sectoral aggregation
used for this study is shown in the Appendix. The GTAP database has been
integrated with CO2 emissions data provided by Ludena (2007).
4 Policy design
Our policy analysis has been specifically designed for a welfare assessment of
VAT fraud in the European carbon market.
Following Kemfert et al. (2006), we first apply the “business-as-usual” (BAU)
emissions for the period leading up to 2007 for each of the sectors. Then we
simulate the first phase of EU ETS (2005–2007) by allowing all designated
sectors of each region to trade in emissions with each other. Emissions trading
is also allowed across national borders of the EU Member States. If the permit
price is higher (lower) than the domestic abatement cost, the difference between
allocated CO2 allowances (emission targets) and CO2 emissions level is positive
(negative) and the country is a net seller (buyer) with positive (negative) emis-
sions trading revenues.
The emissions trading revenues (Er) are calculated as follows:
Er = 1 + trð ÞPrQr (8)
where tr is the ad-valorem tax (VAT) rate, Pr and Qr are, respectively, the market
price and the total amount of emissions permits exchanged (equal to the
difference between allocated CO2 allowances and CO2 emissions level).
If no VAT fraud occurs, the change in income from emissions trading for the
regional household in country r, ΔYr, will be equal to the sum of the change in
income due to the emissions trading revenues, Er = 1 + trð ÞPrQr, and the change
in income for the government (equal to the difference between the VAT charged
and then paid by the seller to the government, trPrQr, and the refund to the
buyer, trPrQr), that is:
ΔYr =Er + trPrQr − trPrQr =Er (9)
If VAT fraud occurs, the regional household receives emissions trading revenues
(Er), but the VAT charged is not paid by the seller to the government that refunds
the buyer. Thus, the change in income for the regional household in country r,
ΔYr, will be equal to the sum of the change in income due to emissions trading
revenues, Er = 1 + trð ÞPrQr, and the change in income for the government (equal
to the refund to the buyer, trPrQr), that is
ΔYr =Er − trPrQr (10)
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The difference between eqs (9) and (10) gives us the amount of the VAT fraud
due to emissions trading in country r, Vr, that is:
Vr = trPrQr (11)
Given Er and tr, and using eq. (8), it follows that PrQr =
Er
1 + tr
and the VAT fraud
can thus be rewritten as follows:
Vr =
trEr
1 + tr
(12)
Furthermore, as the transaction between the seller (missing trader) and the
buyer occurs in the same country and, hence, the VAT fraud is related to the
country’s transaction and occurs if the country is a net seller or a net buyer.
Thus, the VAT fraud is calculated on the absolute value of the emissions trading
revenues as follows:
Vr =
tr Erj j
1 + tr
(13)
which is simulated by decreasing the indirect tax revenues to government.
5 Simulation results
Table 1 reports the results in terms of allocated CO2 allowances and the emis-
sions trading revenues, valued at market price, of the simulation related to the
first phase of EU ETS. We find that Spain is the main seller of emissions permits,
with a share of the total positive emissions trading revenues of almost 52%,
followed by Estonia, with a share of 28%. Amongst the main buyers, there is the
United Kingdom with a share of the total negative emissions trading revenues of
about 76%, followed by Bulgaria and Latvia, with a share of 10%. The revenues
from EU ETS are, generally, higher for the countries with the highest number of
allocated CO2 allowances. However, some countries with a high number of
allocated CO2 allowances become the main buyers of emission permits, such
as the United Kingdom. This is because in the United Kingdom the permit price
is lower than the domestic abatement cost, so in this country it is more efficient
to buy CO2 allowances than to reduce CO2 emissions levels.
In terms of welfare, we compute the equivalent variation as a money metric
measure of welfare and we find that positive (negative) emissions trading revenues
mainly yield welfare gains (loss). For Portugal, we find welfare loss associated
with positive emissions trading revenues, but we can consider Portugal as an
An Assessment of Carousel Value-Added Tax Fraud 11
Authenticated | maria.berrittella@unipa.it author's copy
Download Date | 4/20/17 1:09 PM
outlier due to the small value of the emissions trading revenues, that is, on the one
hand, they have a positive income effect on welfare (direct effect); on the other
hand, they have negative effects on welfare due to terms of trade and allocative
efficiency (indirect effects) that offset the income effect. Also for Slovenia, which is
a net seller, a negative equivalent variation occurs; but in this case the sum of
direct and indirect effects does not yield significant welfare loss.
Further, we investigate the question of what the welfare effects would be if
the VAT fraud were to occur in the European carbon market (Table 2). We have
excluded from this policy scenario three small countries (Luxembourg, Cyprus
Table 1: First phase of the EU ETS (2005–2007).
Country Allocated CO
allowances
(million tonnes
per year)
Emissions
trading
revenues
($ millions)
Equivalent variation
($ millions, change
w.r.t. BAU scenario)
Type
 aut Austria  . . Net Seller
 bel Belgium . . . Net Seller
 dnk Denmark . –. –. Net Buyer
 fin Finland . . . Net Seller
 fra France . . . Net Seller
 deu Germany  . . Net Seller
 gbr United Kingdom . –. –. Net Buyer
 grc Greece . . . Net Seller
 irl Ireland . . . Net Seller
 ita Italy . . . Net Seller
 lux Luxembourg .  . Net Seller
 nld Netherlands . . . Net Seller
 prt Portugal . . –. Net Seller
 esp Spain . . . Net Seller
 swe Sweden . . . Net Seller
 bgr Bulgaria . –. –. Net Buyer
 cyp Cyprus .  –. Net Seller
 cze Czech Republic . . . Net Seller
 hun Hungary . . . Net Seller
 mlt Malta .  –. Net Buyer
 pol Poland . . . Net Seller
 rom Romania . . . Net Seller
 svk Slovakia . –. –. Net Buyer
 svn Slovenia . . –. Net Seller
 est Estonia  . . Net Seller
 lva Latvia . –. –. Net Buyer
 ltu Lithuania . . . Net Seller
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and Malta), because they have zero emissions trading revenues. The VAT fraud
has been obtained by applying the standard tax rates as defined in the EU
Member States. Although the GTAP model applies the effective tax rate, we
have applied the standard tax rate, because the effective tax rates (equal to
5%, on average) are much lower than the standard tax rates and, hence, a
downward bias may occur if we apply the effective tax rates.
Our findings in Table 2 show that the VAT fraud yields welfare loss with
respect to the first phase of the EU ETS. There is an increasing relationship
between the VAT fraud and the welfare loss (Figure 2(a)). The highest welfare
loss occurs in Spain among the seller countries and in the United Kingdom
among the buyer countries. The welfare loss is expected to be approximately
equal to $6 (on average) per $1 of VAT fraud in the EU countries, which implies
Table 2: EU ETS VAT fraud.
Country Standard tax
rate (%)
VAT fraud
($millions)
Equivalent variation
($ millions, change
w.r.t. st Phase)
Welfare loss
per $ of VAT
fraud ($)
aut Austria  . –. .
bel Belgium  . –. .
dnk Denmark  . –. .
fin Finland  . –. .
fra France  . –. .
deu Germany  . –. .
gbr United
Kingdom
 . –. .
grc Greece  . –. .
irl Ireland  . –. .
ita Italy  . –. .
nld Netherlands  . –. .
prt Portugal  . –. .
esp Spain  . –. .
swe Sweden  . –. .
bgr Bulgaria  . –. .
cze Czech Republic  . –. .
hun Hungary  . –. .
pol Poland  . –. .
rom Romania  . –. .
svk Slovakia  . –. .
svn Slovenia  . –. .
est Estonia  . –. .
lva Latvia  . –. .
ltu Lithuania  . –. .
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a welfare decrease of almost 20% (on average) with respect to the first phase of
the EU ETS. The relationship between the VAT fraud and the welfare loss per $1
of VAT fraud is decreasing (Figure 2(b)). This means that there is a diminishing
marginal effect of the VAT fraud on welfare loss.
Table 3 reports the welfare decomposition. Following Hanslow (2000) and
Huff and Hertel (2000), we decompose the welfare change in a series of compo-
nents. In particular, we identify three contributions to welfare change: terms of
trade, allocative efficiency and income change. The contribution to welfare
change in terms of trade is due to changes in the prices received from an
economy’s exports relative to the prices paid for its imports. The contribution
to welfare change in terms of allocative efficiency is due to the change in the
allocation of productive resources. The contribution to welfare change in terms
of income is due to the change in the income of the regional household. The sum
of the welfare contributions (in percentage) must be equal to 100%. The analysis
of the results on welfare decomposition shows common results for the EU
countries. The terms of trade effects, equal to 64% on average, substantially
prevail over the others. The lowest contribution is due to income change (3.5%
on average). In the case of Bulgaria we find that the contributions to welfare
change in terms of allocative efficiency and income are negative, because the
welfare change due to VAT fraud in this country is due to the sum of two
opposite effects: (i) increase of net exports that yields welfare loss and negative
income change; (ii) allocation of productive resources so as to increase effi-
ciency that yields welfare gains and positive income change. The total effect on
welfare is negative, obtained by the contribution of terms of trade that prevail
over the other two contributions (allocative efficiency and income). This means
that the welfare loss in terms of trade effects is slightly reduced by the welfare
gains due to the contributions in terms of allocative efficiency and income rather
than reinforced as occurs in the other countries.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Welfare loss vs. VAT fraud.
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6 The reverse charge mechanism
On March 2010 the European Commission adopted Directive 2010/23/EC, allow-
ing EU countries to apply a reverse charge mechanism on carbon emissions
allowances.
xThe reverse charge mechanism means that no VAT is charged by the
supplier to taxable customers who, in turn, become liable for the payment of
the VAT; the buyer only, not the seller, is responsible for surrendering VAT on
domestically traded emissions allowances. Thus, a reverse charge system obli-
gates the buyer to pay the VAT on purchased allowances directly to the autho-
rities, rather than including the VAT in the purchase price and leaving the seller
responsible for the payment of this amount to the authorities. In practice,
Table 3: Welfare decomposition, contribution in % to the equivalent variation (EU ETS VAT
fraud).
Country Terms of trade Allocative efficiency Income
aut Austria . . .
bel Belgium . . .
dnk Denmark . . .
fin Finland . . .
fra France . . .
deu Germany . . .
gbr United Kingdom . . .
grc Greece . . .
irl Ireland . . .
ita Italy . . .
nld Netherlands . . .
prt Portugal . . .
esp Spain . . .
swe Sweden . . .
bgr Bulgaria . –. –.
cze Czech Republic . . .
hun Hungary . . .
pol Poland . . .
rom Romania . . .
svk Slovakia . . .
svn Slovenia . . .
est Estonia . . .
lva Latvia . . .
ltu Lithuania . . .
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taxable persons with a full rights of deduction input VAT purchase would be
able to declare and deduct VAT at the same time without any actual payment to
the treasury. These revisions have enabled Member States to apply a reverse
charge system mechanism to the VAT treatment of emissions allowances, a
measure that, if implemented consistently across the EU, would prevent the
possibility of VAT fraud on the EU ETS. However, this Directive only created the
option for Member States to temporarily adopt this regime. Since it entered into
force on April 5, 2010 many Member States have failed to implement this reverse
charge system. A reverse charge will stop carousel fraud with these specific
carbon credits, but it is only effective if all EU countries apply this measure.
Otherwise, fraudsters continue to move to countries where the reverse charge
measure does not apply.
7 Conclusions
The EU ETS is an important policy instrument to achieve climate policy
objectives, such as the Kyoto commitments. But the past years have seen
VAT carousel fraud emerge as a major threat in the European carbon market.
Thus, this article has investigated the welfare effects due to the existence of
VAT fraud in the EU ETS applying a CGE model. Our findings show that there
will be welfare gains from the elimination of VAT fraud in the European carbon
market, but the welfare change is not equal amongst the EU Member States. In
fact, some countries may gain more than others from the elimination of VAT
fraud. This result must be related to the heterogeneity of the EU Member States.
However, from this analysis we can draw three common results, which are
striking. Firstly, there is an increasing relationship between the VAT fraud and
the welfare loss. Secondly, there is a diminishing marginal effect of the VAT
fraud on the welfare loss. Thirdly, the welfare loss is higher than the VAT
fraud; in fact, we find that the welfare loss is six times (on average) higher than
the value of the VAT fraud.
Different legislative measures may be applied to reduce the welfare loss due
to VAT fraud in the EU carbon market. For example, the French authorities have
imposed a zero-rated VAT status on domestic trades of emission allowances after
the Bluenext spot exchange case. The European Commission has adopted
Directive 2010/23/EC, allowing EU countries to apply a reverse charge mechan-
ism on carbon emissions allowances. However, to be successful, the reverse
charge mechanism and any other legislative measure requires law harmoniza-
tion amongst the European countries. To this aim, the EU Commission has
developed the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation (MRR), by Commission
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Regulation (EU) No.601/2012 of 21 June 2012, and the Accreditation and
Verification Regulation (AVR), by Commission Regulation (EU) No.600/2012 of
21 June 2012, recognizing that robust, transparent, consistent and accurate
monitoring and reporting with accreditation and verification of greenhouse gas
emissions are essential for the effective operation of the EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS) and thus the EU’s key mechanism for cost-effective reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, Commission Regulation (EU) No 389/2013 of
2 May 2013 has established a Union Registry, which provides a harmonized basis
to transfer allowances across the EU Member States.
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Appendix
Table 4: Categorization of regions and sectors.
Regions Description Sectors Description
aut Austria coa Coal
bel Belgium oil Oil
dnk Denmark gas Gas
fin Finland omn Minerals nec
fra France tex Textiles
deu Germany wap Wearing apparel
gbr United Kingdom ppp Paper products, publishing
grc Greece p_c Petroleum, coal products
irl Ireland crp Chemical, rubber, plastic prod
ita Italy nmm Mineral products nec
lux Luxembourg i_s Ferrous metals
nld Netherlands nfm Metals nec
prt Portugal fmp Metals products
esp Spain mvh Motor vehicles and parts
swe Sweden ele Electronic equipment
bgr Bulgaria ome Machinery and equipment nec
cyp Cyprus omf Manufactures nec
cze Czech Republic ely Electricity
hun Hungary wtr Water
mlt Malta cns Construction
pol Poland roe Rest of the economy
rom Romania
svk Slovakia
svn Slovenia
est Estonia
lva Latvia
ltu Lithuania
row Rest of World
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